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ABSTRACT 
The U.S.Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP), located 
at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), has been chartered 
with the responsibility for developing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) standardized canisters and a 
transportation cask system for shipping DOE SNF to the national repository.  The mandate for 
this development is outlined in the Memorandum of Agreement for Acceptance of Department of 
Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste that states, “EM shall design and 
fabricate … DOE SNF canisters for shipment to RW.” (1)  It also states, “EM shall be 
responsible for the design, NRC certification, and fabrication of the transportation cask system 
for DOE SNF canisters or bare DOE SNF in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71.” (2)  In 
fulfillment of these requirements, the NSNFP has developed four SNF standardized canister 
configurations and has conceptually designed a versatile transportation cask system for shipping 
the canisters to the national repository.1
The standardized canister sizes were derived from the national repository waste package design 
for co-disposal of SNF with high-level waste (HLW).  One SNF canister can be placed in the 
center of the waste package or one can be placed in one of five radial positions, replacing a HLW 
canister.  The internal cavity of the transportation cask was derived using the same logic, 
matching the size of the internal cavity of the waste package.  The size of the internal cavity for 
the transportation cask allows the shipment of multiple canister configurations with the 
application of a removable basket design. The standardized canisters have been designed to be 
loaded with DOE SNF, placed into interim storage, shipped to the national repository, and placed 
in a waste package without having to be reopened.  Significant testing has been completed that 
clearly demonstrates that the standardized canisters can safely achieve their intended design 
goals.  The transportation cask system will include all of the standard design features, with the 
addition of dual containment for the shipment of failed fuel.  The transportation cask system will 
also meet the rigorous licensing requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to 
ensure that the design and the methods of fabrication employed will result in a shipping cask that 
will safely contain the radioactive materials under all credible accident scenarios.  
The standardization of the SNF canisters and the versatile design of the transportation cask 
system will eliminate a proliferation of designs and simplify the operations at the user sites and 
the national repository.    
1 Work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management under 
DOE Idaho Operations Office Contract DE - AC07-99ID13727.
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INTRODUCTION
In accordance with the provisions of a Memorandum of Agreement between DOE’s Office of 
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) and DOE’s Office of Environmental 
Management (EM), the NSNFP has been tasked with the responsibility to devise, design, and 
develop, as necessary standardized canisters and an optimized transportation system for shipping 
the standardized canisters or bare SNF.  This presentation describes the standardized canisters 
and the transportation system that is being developed for the safe handing, storage, and 
transportation of DOE SNF to the national repository. 
Development of the standardized canisters and the transportation system have been under way 
since 1997.  The NSNFP worked with OCRWM, the INEEL, the Hanford Site, Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and the Savannah River Site to develop the 
containers, referred to as the standardized DOE SNF canisters.  These standardized canisters for 
DOE-owned SNF have the purpose of 1) providing a standard and easy-to-handle unit to confine 
DOE SNF; 2) providing durable units for storing SNF; 3) providing easily transportable units; 
and 4) ultimately, providing a unit for final disposal at the national repository, without the 
necessity of the DOE SNF being removed from the canister or reopening a sealed canister.  The 
sizes of the standardized canisters are based on the internal dimensions of the repository waste 
package design for co-disposal of SNF with HLW.  Once the sizes, materials, and configurations 
of the standardize canisters were established, full size prototypes were built and drop tested to 
ensure that the canisters would withstand handling accident conditions without failure.  
Computer modeling of accidental drops was first employed to ensure the adequacy of the design 
and then actual drop testing was performed to verify the accuracy of the models.  Preliminary 
Design Specification for Department of Energy Standardized Canisters, DOE/SNF/REP-011, has 
been written to document the canister design (with drawings) as well as the basic loads and 
criteria necessary to achieve repository acceptance. (3) 
The transportation system was developed based on the same repository waste package design for 
co-disposal.  The internal cavity of the transportation cask is essentially the same as the waste 
package.  This will allow a full waste package of material to be shipped to the repository in a 
single shipment.  The transportation cask system concept is a rail cask with removable baskets 
that will allow for multiple configurations of canisters or bare SNF to be packaged for shipment 
by simply replacing the baskets.  This feature will make the cask as versatile as possible.  Using 
a rail cask will also significantly reduce the number of shipments required. The cask will 
incorporate conventional features that will facilitate the design and licensing of the system in 
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.  A significant amount of analysis has been 
performed to ensure that the conceptual design will meet the structural, thermal, and shielding 
requirements.  Recently, a procurement design specification was drafted for procurement of the 
design and licensing of the system.  This document was sent to the user sites for review and 
comment.  The conceptual design will be finalized based on the comments received, and the 
NSNFP will then be ready to proceed with the procurement of the design and licensing of the 
transportation system. 
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STANDARDIZED CANISTER DESIGN OBJECTIVE 
One of the goals of the NSNFP was to develop a container for DOE SNF.  The objective was to 
seal the many types and varied geometries of DOE SNF in a finite number of these containers to 
simplify handling during initial interim storage, then during transportation to the nation's 
repository, and finally during the efforts necessary to place the DOE SNF into the repository for 
final disposal. 
To maintain simplicity, efficiency, and to keep costs low, the intent was to have these canisters 
envelop the SNF but not to provide numerous safety features, such as shielding.  Other 
components (including the interim storage facilities, the transportation packagings, and the 
repository waste packages) could be relied on to provide these other safety functions. 
Although the goal was to shift various safety functions onto other facilities or components, the 
potential still exists that when these canisters are being handled by themselves, they could be 
accidentally dropped. This means that the standardized DOE SNF canister has to be robust 
enough to withstand anticipated operational loads and at least confine the DOE SNF after an 
accidental drop event. Therefore, providing some means of protecting these canisters during 
potential drop events was an important design objective.  
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM DESIGN OBJECTIVE 
The design objective for the transportation system is to devise an optimized system that will 
safely transport all spent nuclear fuel types in DOE-EM’s inventory. 
This objective statement contains significant key words, the first of which is “an optimized 
system.”  Devising a system for a specific fuel type is a relatively simple requirement.  Devising 
a system for all fuel types, sizes, configurations, and enrichments is a challenge.  This requires an 
intelligent compromise among the diverse requirements, and the resulting system, while ideal for 
a few of the nuclear fuel types, will only be adequate for all others.  On the other hand, building 
unique systems for each of the fuels would be prohibitively costly in terms of the cost of 
licensing, acquisition, and in the complexities of handling gear and operations.  The system 
concept described here is adequate for the transportation of all fuels in DOE’s inventory.  
Although not always achieving the highest transportation efficiency, the most painstaking search 
of DOE’s inventory failed to identify a single fuel type that could not be shipped by this system.  
The team working on the concept recognized in the early stages of development that in order to 
achieve an optimum design, versatility must be a key aspect of the system.  Accordingly, the 
cask has removable and interchangeable internal components, sometimes referred to as baskets, 
that can be custom-tailored to each specific fuel type or fuel container.  These baskets can be 
changed out to meet a particular shipper’s demands.  The requirement for five different basket 
configurations have been identified to date; others are highly possible.  The advantage of this 
approach is that, should the need arise to ship a previously unidentified material requiring the use 
of an internal basket different from those listed in the licensing documents, the cost of a full 
licensing review, estimated at several millions of dollars, is avoided.  This is because the 
resulting change can be accomplished by a relatively simple amendment to the cask’s existing 
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license.  The resulting system may still not be ideal, but an acceptable compromise will have 
been achieved. 
Another equally important set of key words is “safely transport.”  The transportation of SNF is 
conducted according to the regulations provided in Title 49, Part 173, Subpart I of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, using packages that satisfy the requirements set forth in Part 71 of Title 10 
of the Code of Federal Regulations. (4)  The safety of the transportation casks and their ability to 
withstand certain specified events under normal handling and accident conditions are detailed in 
10 CFR 71 while the related supporting requirements and guidance are provided in Regulatory 
Guide Series 7 (Reg. Guides) and in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff Reports 
(NUREGs) 1609 and 1617. (5)(6)(7)  The first of the two NUREGs applies to all Type B 
packages while the latter is specific to casks used for the transportation of SNF. 
The regulatory and guidance documents place high reliance on consensus codes and standards 
developed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), and the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM).  
The objective of the application of all of the requirements is to ensure that the resulting package 
will safely transport the specified contents and will safely withstand the consequences of credible 
events attributable to handling and/or accidents. 
The final key words to consider are “all spent fuel types.”  As noted earlier, DOE has some 
amount of virtually every type of nuclear fuel ever used in the United States.  The configurations 
range from short, slender fuel pins to robust fuel assemblies consisting of arrays of fuel pins or 
plates.   With a height of nearly 508 cm (200 inches), canisters containing six High Temperature 
Gas Cooled Reactor fuel elements from the Fort St. Vrain reactor represent the tallest items in 
the DOE’s inventory.  At the opposite end of the scale are small fuel fragments and sections of 
fuel pins.  The uses of the fuels are as varied as their configurations, ranging from isotope 
production, irradiation, to power generation.  The materials of construction and levels of 
enrichments are also subject to large variations.   In addition, many of the fuels are damaged, 
most often as consequences of deliberate events for studying fuel behavior under various normal 
and extreme operating conditions.  However, the inventory also includes fuels damaged by 
accidents such as the Three Mile Island Unit 2 event or by less than ideal conditions of storage.  
A significant portion of the spent fuels owned by the Department falls into the damaged 
category.  The transportation system concept was designed to accommodate these extremes as 
well as all others in between. 
STANDARDIZED CANISTER DESIGN
During FY98 and FY99, the NSNFP developed the standardized DOE SNF canister design.  The 
standardized DOE SNF canister design has two diameters (18 inch and 24 inch) and two lengths 
(10 ft and 15ft), and is made of 316L stainless steel.  The nominal wall thickness is 3/8 inch for 
the 18-inch diameter canister and ½ inch for the 24-inch canister.  Although a 50 psig internal 
pressure is established for design conditions (22 psig operational), the standardized DOE SNF 
canister actually has the capability of withstanding a much higher pressure limit (working 
pressure of about 350 psig).  This is just one example of the robust design of the standardized 
DOE SNF canister. Maximum total loaded weight limits for all four canister geometries are 
listed in Table I. 
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Table I. Maximum allowable canister weights 
Canister diameter 
(nominal) 
Maximum weight of  10 ft 
canister (lb) 
Maximum weight of  15 ft 
canister (lb) 
18 inch 5,005 6,000 
24 inch 8,996 10,000 
This canister design incorporates an integral energy-absorbing skirt (Figures 1 and 2) that 
deforms on impact during an accidental drop event, providing a significant amount of protection 
to the actual pressure boundary or containment system of the canister.  The skirt helps to protect 
the canister containment system in virtually all accidental drop events by absorbing impact 
energy.  Only when the canister impacts in a horizontal (flat) orientation does the skirt not absorb 
significant energy.  However, in horizontal orientations, the entire length of the canister is then 
able to absorb drop energy.  This deformed skirt can be removed if necessary without disrupting 
the canister containment system, enhancing the canister’s ability to still fit into other containers.
Contents
Drop Resistant End
(head, skirt, and ring)
Canister
Main Body
Impact Plate
Drop Resistant End
(head, skirt, ring, and
impact plate)
Figure 1.  Standardized DOE SNF canister overall design (section view)
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Wall
3/8-Inch Thick
316L SA-312
Impact Plate
2-Inch Thick
CS A-36
Flanged Head
3/8-Inch Thick
316L SA-240
Skirt
3/8-Inch Thick
316L SA-312
Lifting Ring
1-Inch Wide
1/2-Inch Thick
316L SA-240
Figure 2.  18-Inch Canister Lower End 
A preliminary design specification was written to document the canister design (with drawings) 
as well as the basic loads and criteria necessary to achieve repository acceptance.  This document 
was not written to be the Design Specification as identified in Section III, Division 3 of the 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code. (8)  It was written to be used by various 
interim storage and transportation personnel (as applicable) as a basis for the generation of the 
standardized canister design specification and the following design report.  However, the 
preliminary design specification performs the important function of providing the common 
design basis for all standardized DOE SNF canisters, regardless of how each standardized DOE 
SNF canister is used at the various DOE sites during initial SNF loading, interim storage, or 
transportation to the repository.  Regardless of the individual use history of each standardized 
canister, the repository can be assured of receiving a standardized DOE SNF canister that 
properly interfaces with facility lifting fixtures, a canister that properly fits in designated places, 
and a canister that will perform as expected in case of an accidental drop or other significant 
loading event. 
With a clear focus on the future, the preliminary design specification requires the standardized 
DOE SNF canister to be N-stamped per the criteria of the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, 
Division 3.  The basis for this requirement is that the standardized DOE SNF canister can then 
function (if necessary) as the inner containment system for transporting damaged SNF, based on 
the guidance provided in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.5.1.3 in NUREG-1617.  Because the current 
decision is to allow the various DOE sites to procure the standardized DOE SNF canisters on an 
as-needed basis over the next several decades, imposing ASME Section III criteria provides the 
added rigor of an authorized nuclear inspector (onsite) and proper Code fabrication techniques. 
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TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
General Description 
The system concept shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in greater detail hereafter was 
developed based on the key assumption that all shipments from the DOE consolidation sites to 
the proposed repository will be made by rail or by rail heavy-haul combination intermodal 
transport.  The repository expressed the preference for shipment by rail with a view toward 
minimizing the number of handling operations and transportation from the shippers’ sites.  The 
primary system consists of a cylindrical lead or depleted uranium shielded external vessel with 
impact limiters at both ends, nested in a transport cradle with appropriate lifting, tie-down, and 
pivoting trunnions.  Cask and payload weight, without impact limiters, is expected to be under 
the 150 U.S. ton limit currently proposed by the repository.  Using appropriate interfacing 
equipment, the cask can be loaded and unloaded in either wet or dry environments in facilities 
with clear lifting heights of approximately 15 meters (45 feet) or higher and with crane capacities 
of 150 U.S. tons or greater.  Special handling gear such as lifting yokes, transfer casks, and 
loading collars will have to be developed based on site- and fuel-specific requirements.
Figure 3.  Conceptual design model. 
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Figure 4. Cask assembled for shipment in transport cradle with impact limiters. 
Despite the fact that DOE-owned fuels comprise a relatively small percentage of the total volume 
to be placed in the repository, the actual number of individual spent fuel assemblies, pins, pieces, 
and fragments number well over 100,000 and are grouped into about 250 categories.  The sheer 
numbers of items would impose a significant handling burden on a repository that is expected to 
be operating as a production facility where cask turn-around times are of the essence.  In 
addition, as already noted in this document, a considerable number of the fuels are damaged and 
require some form of containerization (ie. standardized canisters). 
Applicable Codes 
In addition to withstanding the impacts imposed by normal conditions of transport as specified in 
10 CFR 71.71, the casks must be designed and built such that they will also survive the 
hypothetical accident scenarios described in 10 CFR 71.73.  The designers/builders of casks 
must show by tests and analyses that the packaging will maintain containment of the materials 
under a set of specified conditions.  Without elaborating here on the specifics contained in the 
regulations, it is important to discuss how such level of assurance of safety is achieved. 
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The NRC places strong emphasis on the application of established codes and consensus 
standards.  Primary among these is the requirement that the containment system be designed, 
fabricated, examined, and tested according to the various applicable sections and divisions of the 
ASME BP&V Code as specified in Tables 1-1 and 1-2 of NUREG 1617.  These requirements are 
the foundation of all activities performed in providing the system described herein.  In addition 
to the applicable code sections, the cask must also be leak tested in accordance with ANSI 14.5 
after each assembly or maintenance activity. (9)  The DOE SNF cask system is expected to be in 
full compliance with the requirements specified in NUREG 1617 and, consequently, with the 
applicable sections of the various codes (e.g., ANSI, ASME, ASTM). 
Materials of Construction 
The primary materials of construction are expected to be 304L-type stainless steel plates and 
forgings.  A singular feature of the cask closure is the use of bore seals made of neoprene rather 
than the more conventional face seals used in the past.  Bore seals provide greater assurance of 
the cask maintaining leak-tight integrity under accidental conditions of transport.  The need for 
unilateral (U) or multilateral (M) approval status has not yet been evaluated.  However, in an 
effort to bring the system closer in line with current NRC philosophy, it is expected to be 
designed and analyzed to meet the applicable requirements of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s safety standards for transportation packages (ST-1, formerly Safety Series 6) thus 
earning a      “–85” designation signifying compliance thereto. (10) 
The external vessel or cask, its closure, and impact limiters provide the shielding, thermal, and 
impact protection for the contents.  The inner and outer shells of the external vessel will be 
fabricated from stainless steel with a layer of either lead or depleted uranium between the shells 
for gamma shielding.  The use of borated stainless steel for the inner shell to act as neutron 
shielding is also under consideration.  The closure and lower end of the cask are anticipated to be 
stainless steel forgings with sufficient thickness to provide shielding equivalent to that of the 
shell. 
Containments 
As shown in Figure 3, the proposed transportation system concept consists of an external cask 
with clear internal dimensions of approximately 5.285 meters (208 inches) deep by 1.822 meters 
(71.7 inches) in diameter.  The entire assembly of components is referred to as the primary 
containment vessel (PCV).  Also as shown in Figure 3, inside the PCV is an optional removable 
inner, or secondary containment vessel (ICV), made of approximately 1-inch thick borated 
stainless steel.  The ICV’s clear inside dimensions are approximately 4.8 meters (189 inches) 
deep by 1.75 meters (68.9 inches) in diameter. 
The closure of the ICV is expected to be made of a single stainless steel forging of sufficient 
thickness to provide shielding equivalent to the walls of the PCV.  The ICV’s sole function is to 
maintain containment of the materials in shipment.  Around the sides and the bottom, the ICV, in 
and of itself, provides only a modest amount of gamma shielding and thermal rejection, and 
therefore, it is not expected to be taken credit for in the analysis.  The closure of the ICV, 
however, is expected to provide sufficient shielding to allow hands-on performance of leak 
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testing after maintenance or upon assembly of the inner vessel after the cask is loaded for 
shipment. 
Both the PCV and ICV are equipped with bolted closures.  Subject to the results of the analyses 
to be performed, the PCV closure is bolted in place using 36 1.5-inch diameter ASTM Grade    
A-320 6-UNC-2A bolts torqued to about 500 foot-pounds and, also subject to confirmation via 
engineering analyses, the ICV closure is expected to be bolted in place using 32 0.75-inch 
diameter ASTM Grade A-320 6-UNC-2A bolts torqued to about 250 foot-pounds, in both cases 
lubricated and preloaded to about half of the final torque values.  As noted before in this 
document, the closures are equipped with bore seals (rather than face seals) and, therefore, 
torquing of the bolts is not a critical requirement. 
Note: The regulations in 10 CFR 71.63 require that shipments of certain forms of 
plutonium and materials containing more than 20 curies of plutonium be made in a cask 
featuring two levels of containment.  For virtually all instances, the cladding of intact fuel 
assemblies is regarded as the first level of containment with the cask providing the 
second level of containment and therefore, the requirement for two levels of containment 
is satisfied.  However, this is not the case where the cladding is damaged and, 
consequently, cannot be considered as a level of containment.  As noted before, a 
significant portion of the fuels owned by the DOE is damaged and, in the absence of 
proof that the fuels contain less than 20 curies of plutonium, a second level of 
containment is required.  Under the regulations of the NRC promulgated in Section 4.4.1 
of NUREG-1617, in order for a container to be called a containment, it has to be 
fabricated according to ASME Section III, Division 3 requirements and, after closure, 
leak tested according to the requirements of ANSI 14.5.  As the radiation level around 
canisters loaded with spent fuel is in the lethal range, the operations of final closure 
welding and subsequent leak testing would have to be performed remotely.  The cask 
system designers took into consideration the extreme complexity of attempting to meet 
these requirements with the use of internal canisters individually welded closed and leak 
tested according to ASME Section III, Division 3, and ANSI 14.5 respectively, and 
concluded that providing an inner containment vessel as a part of the transportation 
packaging is a simpler and safer route to compliance with the dual containment 
requirements of 10 CFR 71.63 and the applicable sections of NUREG-1617. 
It is important to consider the bases for the internal dimensions of the cask. The repository has 
devised a disposal configuration consisting of five 610-millimeter (24-inch) diameter canisters of 
vitrified HLW in a circular array with a 451-millimeter (18-inch) diameter standard SNF canister 
in the center position.  The resulting array of canisters requires a waste disposal package with 
internal diameters in the approximate range of 1.73 to 1.76 meters (68.1 to 69.3 inches).  
Depending on their sources of production (e.g., INEEL, Hanford, or Savannah River Site), the 
HLW canisters are in lengths of  3 or 4.5 meters (120 or 180 inches).  In order to maximize 
production efficiency at the repository, the internal dimensions of the waste disposal package for 
the longer 4.5-meter (180-inch) canisters were adopted for the internal dimensions of the 
transportation system also.  This would allow the shippers to deliver the equivalent of one waste 
package load of materials to the repository, an important consideration for a production-type 
facility with limited capability for onsite short-term storage and with the need to maximize the 
periodic rate of throughput. 
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Shielding and Criticality Control 
One of the most important features of all Type B packages is the requirement for them to shield 
the external environment from the contents.  Regardless of their energies, the emission of alpha 
and beta particles are of no concern because of their low abilities to penetrate even a modest 
amount of shielding.  Similarly, fast neutrons pose no problems as they are incapable of 
interacting with matter while traveling at relativistic speeds.  The concerns are slow or thermal 
neutrons and gamma radiation emitted by SNF, each requiring a different kind of shielding.  
Gamma rays are shielded by high density materials such as lead or depleted uranium while the 
most expedient method for stopping thermal neutrons is with the use of neutronic poisons, boron 
being the most common among them.  As noted before, the present view is that  the appropriate 
parts of the cask internals will be made with stainless steel incorporating a neutronic poison such 
as boron although the use of gadolinium as an alternate to boron is currently under intensive 
study.  Either lead or depleted uranium may be used for shielding of gamma radiation.  The 
present status of the design admits to either of the two materials for gamma shielding and 
changing from one to the other would not be considered a major impact at this stage of the 
development.
Note: The use of lead as gamma shielding is supported by tradition, relative ease of 
manufacture, and reasonable availability.  However, as it is a D-listed Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous heavy metal, its use and future 
disposition are likely to entail problems.  The use of depleted uranium generally avoids 
the RCRA problem.  However, its use and manufacture entails certain complexities 
normally not encountered with lead fabrication. 
One of the objectives of the design is to maintain radiation exposures as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA).  In keeping with that philosophy, and despite the higher limit allowed by 
the regulations, the design objective is to provide sufficient shielding to reduce the radiation on 
contact to 10 mR/hr or less.  The rationale for the lower limit is that facilities handling only a few 
shipments per year can afford the exposure resulting from a higher contact dose.  However, the 
personnel at the repository, operating as a production facility and handling two or more casks on 
a daily basis, would receive unacceptably high cumulative doses. 
STANDARDIZED CANISTERS AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
The DOE storage site contractors will package most of the DOE SNF in the standardized 
canisters.  Internal baskets will be designed for the various fuel types to facilitate loading and 
maintain configuration control.  The baskets and SNF will be placed in the standardized canisters 
and the top of the canister will be welded on.  There is a plug in the top of canister that allows for 
venting and testing during storage.  Before final shipping to the repository, the canisters will be 
backfilled with helium, and the plug will be seal welded shut.  When the canisters are accepted 
for shipment to the national repository, the appropriate basket will be placed in the transportation 
cask, and the canisters will be loaded in the specified configuration according to the NRC 
license.  Once loaded, the transportation casks will be shipped by rail and/or heavy haul 
transportation to the national repository.  The casks will be unloaded at the repository surface 
facility and packaged in the repository waste packages.  The waste packages will then placed in 
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long-term storage in the repository, and the casks will be returned to the sites for reloading and 
shipment.
CONCLUSION
The repository has accepted the design of the standardized DOE SNF canister and has now 
incorporated it into their project documentation.  The results of the drop testing performed to 
date clearly show that the design of the standardized DOE SNF canister is robust and that its 
containment system can indeed remain intact and functional, even after an accidental drop event. 
Helium leak testing has shown that leaktight conditions can be achieved.  In addition, finite 
element computer analyses can be performed that adequately predict the structural responses of 
these canisters.  This is important for future structural evaluations that were not specifically 
tested.  Therefore, with the standardized DOE SNF canister, the NSNFP has provided the DOE 
complex with an important tool to safely store, transport, and dispose of DOE SNF.  Due to its 
robust design and current acceptance by the repository, additional uses for the standardized DOE 
SNF canister may be proposed, including Greater-Than-Class C waste and other unique 
radioactive materials. 
The NSNFP staff believes that the transportation system concept presented in this document will 
provide for the safe transportation of all spent nuclear fuels in the DOE Environmental 
Management’s custody.  The system is versatile and efficient, accommodating various 
configurations by using removable baskets and also optimizing the number of canisters that can 
be shipped in one shipment.  By matching the cask internal cavity with the waste package 
internal cavity, this system could also be used for shipping HLW canisters.  The NSNFP staff is 
also of the opinion that there are no SNF types in the entire United States inventory that could 
not be safely transported using this system.  Furthermore, the staff believes that the dimensions 
provided here are within a few percent of what the ultimate final design is going to be and the 
licensing of the system, based on precedent, should not encounter insurmountable difficulties.  
The NSNFP staff further submits that the design is subject to changes in response to external 
driving forces.  However, the concept appears to be sound and has survived all challenges to 
date.
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